◆LRB
・Thomas Nagel: The I in Me

‘Philosophy, like science,’ says Strawson, ‘aims to say how things are in reality, and conflict with ordinary thought and language is no more an objection to a philosophical theory than a scientific one.’ Yet his conclusions depart so far from the idea most people have of themselves that it seems natural to describe him as offering not a theory of the self, but rather the view that there is no such thing as the self, distinct from the human being.

・Jerry Fodor: Headaches have themselves

◆Appiah, EE
・http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=17705

J・ドリスおよびJ・J・プリンツによる書評。
われわれの性格の不安定さや道徳的直観の頼りなさを暴露する多くの経験的研究からの挑戦を、アッピアは十分に深刻に受け止めてはいないのではないか（そうした挑戦を前にして、本書でのアッピアがそうであるように、いまだに徳倫理的なスタンスやメタ倫理的キエティズムに安住し続けることは可能なのか）、云々。

The focus of Western moral philosophy has been on questions like "How should I act?" or "What sort of person should I be?" From a first person perspective, these questions are affected by psychological phenomena that make them difficult to address in a satisfactory way. One possible implication of this is that there is no way to assimilate adequately the third and first personal perspectives, because the "third personal" lesson of the human sciences is tantamount to a radical critique of the integrity of the "first personal" subjective point of view. This may be taken to indicate that individual deliberative agents are not sustainable "units of moral analysis." If so, philosophical ethics may need to redirect its focus to the suprapersonal level; for example, on how to organize and arrange institutions and collectives. This focus, in turn, may break down disciplinary divisions between moral and political philosophy. In fact, this is just the sort of approach we see in Appiah's other work.

こうした批判に対するアッピアの返答がどういったものになるかは大よそ予想がつくような気もするけれども、まあともかく、この辺の議論の流れの中でアッピアの立場はかなり独特なものである、と。

◆R. D. Alexander
・John Collier, "Critical Notice of The Biology of Moral Systems" (1991)

◆NDPR
・Mark Schroeder, Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism, Reviewed by Robert Mabrito

◆Coetzee
・http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=16106

The body (soma) is a Greek (and heroic) concept: it implies strength, beauty, and imperviousness to suffering; flesh meanwhile is a biblical concept that implies weakness and vulnerability, corpulence and emaciation, and finally decay and death. Flesh is for eating and being eaten. Its distinctive feature is the wound which, perhaps until now with the volumes we have here, does not appear to have ever been a subject for philosophy.

◆NDPR
・Robert B. Pippin, Hegel's Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life, Reviewed by Timothy Brownlee

Pippin argues that the real uniqueness of Hegel's conception of freedom falls on the objective side. On Pippin's reading, an agent can establish the relevant kind of subjective self-relation only if she already stands within institutional, norm-governed relations of reciprocal recognition to others. This objective element of free actions stems from the fact that Hegel understands justification to be a fundamentally social practice -- "the giving of and asking for reasons" by participants in a set of shared institutions.

◆Clark's reply to Fodor
・http://manwithoutqualities.com/2009/03/25/clarks-reply-to-fodor/

It is that non-biological resources, if hooked appropriately into processes running in the human brain, can form parts of larger circuits that count as genuinely cognitive in their own right.

◆よーしパパ書評しちゃうぞー、とか言ってるの。もう見てらんない。書評ってのはな、もっと殺伐としてるべきなんだよ。
――と誰が言ったか知らないが、最近の某書評のことが某ブログで取り上げられているのを目にして、そういえば前に「ヒドイ書評ランキング」みたいのがどっかにあったよなあと探してみたらこちら（↓）なのでした。

・http://ideasofimperfection.blogspot.com/2006/04/economy-of-prestige.html

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えーと、ちょっとばかり前に少なからず物議をかもした某書評をめぐっては、このように素晴らしく殺伐としたサイトというのも作られているわけですか。。。
正直ちょっとこわいです（>_<）

◆Danto
・Arthur Danto, The Body/Body Problem: Selected Essays, Review by Adrian Haddock (2001)

The keynote essay of the collection is 'Action, Knowledge and Representation', in which Danto attempts to show that the 'Wittgensteinian' programme in the philosophy of mind has "failed, and failed definitively". His target is Anscombe's account of 'practical knowledge', and he contends that he can establish its "wrongness" and thus reveal "the need for their being intentions, whatever may be the problem of their vehicle and location, and whatever may be the philosophical price of countenancing them". And the price, it transpires, is Cartesianism, for their vehicle is the mental representation. However, this is a price we do not have to pay, for Danto's criticisms do not make contact with Anscombe's account.

◆Thompson, LA
書評が出てたけど、あまり大したことは書いてなかったのだった。

◆TLS
・A. N. Wilson: The Paradox Who Was Chesterton

◆Nussbaum
ちょっとメモ。

・Jenny Teichman, "Henry James Among the Philosophers"
　New York Timesに掲載されたLove's Knowledgeの書評。キャロル・ギリガンをはじめ多くの抗議が寄せられたといういわくつきのもの。

・Martha Nussbaum, "Affections of the Greeks"
　こちらはフーコー『快楽の活用』の書評。その素人っぽい方法論（歴史学的にも哲学的にも）に対してかなり手厳しい内容。

His own methods constrain his treatment of philosophical issues in many ways. This is a book about Greek ideas concerning pleasure. But Greek thinkers who discussed pleasure did not assume, as Foucault (heir in this respect to empiricist-utilitarian assumptions) seems to, that pleasure is a feeling or sensation, having its source in activities but distinct from them. Helped to see different possibilities by a language that uses verbal locutions (''enjoy,'' ''take pleasure in'') more often than the noun, the Greeks passionately debated the question, What is pleasure? (For only when it is correctly defined, they believed, can we go on to ask what part it plays in the good life.) Is it, indeed, a feeling? Is it a kind of activity of the organism? Is it neither of these, but instead something that supervenes on activity? Here is an area where Greek arguments do help us to challenge our modern assumptions about pleasure and well-being. Foucault is not enough of a classical scholar even to perceive the issues. / This is part of a larger, enforced neglect in his discussion of the development of the Greek vocabulary of desire. …

・Bosphorus Reflections: Barry Stocker's Weblog：Martha Nussbaum and Michel Foucault on Eros and Ethics in Antiquity

◆LRB
・Jerry Fodor: Where is my mind?

Andy Clark, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action and Cognitive Extensionの書評。

EMT [‘Extended Mind Thesis’] isn’t literally true unless Chalmers’s iPhone is literally an (external) part of his mind; ‘literally’ is among Clark/Chalmers’s favourite adverbs. If minds don’t literally have parts, how can cognitive science literally endorse the claim that they do?

There is a gap between the mind and the world, and (as far as anybody knows) you need to posit internal representations if you are to have a hope of getting across it. Mind the gap. You’ll regret it if you don’t.

心と世界の二元論をどうするかという問題をめぐって、「そんな二元論なんて意味ないよ」派のクラーク（＆チャルマーズ）と「この二元論は断固維持すべきだよ」派のフォーダーとの対立ということになってるようで、そんな中でこの本に関するフォーダーの不満というのは、クラーク＆チャルマーズの"The Extended Mind"に付け加わるような哲学的議論は特に示されてないやないかい、ということから来ているみたいですが、こうした対立はつまるところ、そうした問題を論議することは本質的に哲学者の仕事に属するのか（フォーダーはそんなことで稼ぎを得るべきなのか）という争点に帰着するんではないでしょうか。

If there’s anything we philosophers really hate it’s an untenable dualism. Exposing untenable dualisms is a lot of what we do for a living. It’s no small job, I assure you. […] No wonder philosophers are paid so well.

◆Sehon, TR
・Gilbert Harman, "Physical Science and Common-sense Psychology" [pdf]

・Frederick Stoutland, "Common Sense Psychology and Scientific Explanation" [pdf]

◆NDPR: Geach
・Peter Geach, Truth and Hope: The Furst Franz Josef und Furstin Gina Lectures Delivered at the International Academy of Philosophy, 1998 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 2001), Reviewed by Michael J. Murray

この書評だけを見る限りではかなり逝っちゃってる観も無くはないわけですが、まあ良くも悪くも頑固一徹というべきなのか、うーん…。

◆NDPR
・G.E.M. Anscombe, Faith in a Hard Ground: Essays on Religion, Philosophy and Ethics, Reviewed by Alasdair MacIntyre

前に目を通した時にはよく理解できなかったのでもう一度ゆっくり読み直してはみたものの、でもやっぱりよく分からん。最後の一文が謎。

◆Crisp, Reasons and the Good
・http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=10363

しかしこのレビューを見ただけではクリスプのintuitionismがどういうものかは分からんな。。。

◆TLS
・Alison Gopnik, "Babies and the sticky mitten test: How babies of only three months can learn to have a theory of mind"

◆review of Appiah, Experiments in Ethics
・Peter Singer, "Putting Practice Into Ethics"

◆Martha C. Nussbaum, "Stages of Thought"
・http://www.tnr.com/story_print.html?id=e1bd6ffa-c648-4d40-8efd-40dd1b31b444

Despite the great merits of Cavell's particular insights, however, he has little to say about why we would want to turn to poetic drama in general, and to Shakespeare in particular, in pursuit of philosophical themes. His readings of Shakespeare tend to confirm the philosophical notions for which he has already argued independently, in readings of Wittgenstein, Descartes, and other philosophers. Anyone who fails to read Cavell's justly famous essay on the avoidance of love in King Lear can discover the same theme amply explored by way of Wittgenstein in The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (or by way of Hollywood film comedy in Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage). Little is said about why it might be important to engage with Shakespeare's plays, among all other texts, on those questions. Indeed, Cavell's remarkable reading of Othello was originally published as the tragic conclusion to his philosophical magnum opus, The Claim of Reason, where it follows four hundred pages of argument about Wittgenstein, Austin, and many others.